The current Middle East crisis, particularly the most recent announcement of Yemen’s Houthis declaring a naval blockade and maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia has brought force majeure out of contractual boilerplate clauses and firmly into the boardroom discussions. As pressure grows across key regional shipping routes, parties in the energy, commodities, logistics, maritime trade and transportation are reassessing whether their contractual obligations can still be safely performed and, where they cannot, how the resulting risk should be allocated.

The announcement by Houthis of closure of the strategic maritime strait, Bab el-Mandeb has added a layer of dilemma and uncertainty of the situation and what it can potentially unfold into. Its potential impact extends beyond vessels trading directly with the Kingdom, since shipowners, charterers, cargo interests, traders and insurers may all be affected by the security and operational response that follows.

This development comes against a wider backdrop of disruption affecting regional maritime routes in the Arabian Gulf.  The question is therefore no longer simply whether disruption exists, but whether it has rendered a particular obligation genuinely impossible or whether the circumstances are more accurately addressed, keeping welfare of human life (ship’s crew) at the fore, and safety of vessel, cargo and environment through necessary safe transit measures, safe port/safe berth, insurances, contractual provisions…

 

Regional Developments: Evidence, Not Precedent

Undoubtedly, the recent developments are significant, but they must be viewed in their proper legal context. A force majeure declaration by one entity (a state-linked entity or a major regional operator) does not create a precedent that other parties can automatically follow. Equally, an announcement affecting navigation does not, by itself, suspend every contract connected with the relevant ports or routes.

These situations and developments may nevertheless carry important evidential weight. They demonstrate that the effects of the conflict are not merely theoretical and may extend to production, port access, vessel movements, insurance availability and wider supply chains. In a subsequent dispute, they may therefore form part of the factual background supporting the existence of exceptional circumstances.

However, the burden remains on the party invoking force majeure to establish its own case and it goes to the very root of that act. It must show how the event affected the specific obligation, why performance is impossible or cannot reasonably continue and that any viable alternative remains unavailable.

 

Why Force Majeure Cannot Simply Be “Followed”

Force majeure cannot be invoked by analogy. The fact that another company or regional operator has declared force majeure does not automatically entitle others to suspend, vary or terminate their own obligations.

Courts and arbitral tribunals will look beyond the headlines and focus on the specific facts of the parties before the Court/Tribunal, the governing law, the wording of the contract and importantly, the causal link between the event and the alleged inability to perform. They will also consider whether alternative routes, ports or means of performance were available, whether reasonable steps were taken to mitigate the disruption and whether the contractual notice requirements were properly followed.

The distinction between impossibility and increased difficulty is therefore central. A cargo that cannot be loaded because a terminal has closed, a port has become inaccessible or entry has been prohibited presents a different legal position from a voyage that remains possible but requires additional insurance, a longer route or greater expense. The former may support a force majeure claim, while the latter is more likely to fall within provisions dealing with war risk, deviation, delay, unsafe ports or additional costs.

 

A Maritime Ban Is Not Necessarily a Physical Blockade

The language used to describe the current situation also requires care. A declared maritime ban, embargo or blockade should not automatically be treated as proof that every affected port or route has become physically inaccessible.

The contractual analysis will depend on the practical consequences. A port may remain open while owners refuse to proceed, insurers restrict cover or crews raise legitimate safety concerns. Those consequences may ultimately prevent performance, but the affected party must still demonstrate how the announcement translated into an actual inability to perform.

Therefore, a general reference to regional instability will not be enough to invoke Force Majeure. The legal position should be supported by contemporaneous evidence, including port notices, navigation warnings, security assessments, insurance correspondence, owners’ instructions and documented attempts to identify that reasonable alternatives were explored but were non-existent in the circumstances.

 

UAE Law: The Threshold of Impossibility

Under UAE law, force majeure is based on impossibility rather than hardship.  The new UAE Civil Transactions Law, which came into force on 1 June 2026, preserves the principle that where a supervening force majeure event renders performance of a bilateral contract entirely impossible, the corresponding obligations may lapse. Where the impossibility is only partial, relief may be limited to the affected portion.

The threshold of proof remains high. The event must be beyond the affected party’s control, its consequences must be unavoidable despite reasonable mitigation, and it must prevent performance rather than simply make it slower, riskier or more expensive.

This distinction is particularly relevant in the present environment. Increased freight rates, higher war-risk premiums, congestion and delay may create serious commercial pressure, but they do not necessarily amount to force majeure. By contrast, a legally effective port closure, a government prohibition or a route rendered inaccessible by active hostilities may provide a stronger basis for establishing impossibility.

In each case, the party relying on force majeure must prove a direct causal connection between the event and the obligation that could not be performed.

 

Common Law Perspective: Relief Depends on the Clause

Under English law, force majeure has no independent existence outside the contract. Relief therefore depends entirely on the terms agreed between the parties.

A clause expressly referring to war, blockade, embargo, hostilities, government restrictions, port closures or interference with navigation may provide a basis for relief, whereas a narrower clause may not. Even where the event falls within the wording, the invoking party must still prove that that event caused the non-performance in the manner contemplated by the clause.

Compliance with contractual procedure is equally important. Notice requirements, time limits and mitigation obligations must be complied, as a failure to do so may undermine an otherwise valid claim.

For that reason, a force majeure notice should not be issued prematurely. Where the contractual threshold has not been met, an unsupported declaration may itself create exposure and, in serious cases, be treated as a refusal to perform.

 

War Risk Versus Force Majeure

In many cases arising from the current crisis, force majeure may not be the most appropriate starting point. Maritime and energy contracts often contain detailed war risks and unsafe-port provisions that are specifically designed to address threats to vessels, crews and cargoes.

Where a port remains operational, but the voyage carries a credible threat of attack, the issue may be one of war risk rather than impossibility. Depending on the wording, the relevant clause may permit an owner to refuse orders, require the nomination of an alternative port, authorize deviation or allocate responsibility for additional insurance premiums.

These mechanisms often provide a more precise operational response. Force majeure may have broader consequences, but it generally requires a stronger evidential and causal basis. The correct contractual mechanism will therefore depend on the nature of the obstacle: where performance is prevented, force majeure may be relevant; where it remains possible but unsafe or commercially altered, contractual war-risk or unsafe-port provisions may provide the better fit.

 

Insurance Constraints and Contractual Performance

Insurance will also play a significant role in determining whether a voyage can proceed. Insurers may impose additional premiums, restrict the geographical scope of cover or require enhanced security measures. In more serious circumstances, the necessary cover may become unavailable.

The legal effect will again depend on the contract. A substantial increase in premium will not ordinarily establish force majeure. However, where a particular form of insurance is contractually required and can no longer be obtained, the position may be different.

Parties should therefore distinguish between an unwillingness to accept increased costs and a genuine inability to secure the cover needed for performance. The evidence should clearly record the insurers approached, the terms proposed in the then market circumstances and the reasons why suitable cover was unavailable.

 

The Chain-Reaction Effect

The consequences of the present disruption are unlikely to remain confined to vessels operating in the most exposed areas. Delays, reduced vessel availability, congestion, higher freight rates and tighter insurance conditions may affect the wider contractual chain.

A single shipment may involve a charterparty, a bill of lading, a commodity sale contract and related financing arrangements. If the force majeure and war-risk provisions in those contracts are not aligned, a party may be excused under one agreement while remaining exposed under another.

This makes a back-to-back review essential. Each contract should be assessed not only in isolation, but also in the context of the wider transaction and the obligations that depend upon it.

 

Adapting the Contractual Framework

The changed risk environment has also prompted parties to reconsider how future disruption should be addressed. Existing obligations cannot generally be altered unilaterally, but the parties may agree to amend delivery periods, nominate alternative ports, allocate additional premiums or introduce clearer suspension mechanisms.

Any amendment should identify the circumstances in which it applies and address the consequences for cost, delay, insurance, risk and termination. It should also make clear whether the arrangement applies to a single voyage or to future performance for as long as the disruption continues.

Such measures are commercial solutions rather than retrospective legal justifications. Their value lies in reducing uncertainty before a dispute arises.

 

Practical Priorities for Contracting Parties

Parties should begin with the contract rather than the headline. The force majeure, war-risk, unsafe-port, deviation, insurance, notice and termination provisions should be reviewed together, since the most appropriate remedy may lie outside the force majeure clause itself.

The precise obligation affected should then be identified, along with the evidence showing how the disruption prevented performance. Reasonable alternatives should be considered and documented, including alternative ports, routes, vessels, delivery arrangements and insurance options.

Finally, any contractual notice should be prepared with care and served within the required time. A measured notice that accurately records the known facts will generally place a party in a stronger position than an immediate declaration that overstates the legal effect of an evolving situation.

 

Conclusion: Precision Over Perception

The latest regional developments have intensified the contractual and operational risks facing the shipping and energy sectors. Their impact may extend across ports, vessels, cargoes, insurance arrangements and wider supply chains.

However, the seriousness of the situation does not make force majeure automatic. As discussed above, the decisive question remains whether the specific obligation has become impossible to perform, rather than merely more difficult, dangerous or expensive.

In many cases, the better answer may lie in the contract’s war-risk, unsafe-port, deviation or insurance provisions. The strongest position will therefore belong to parties that identify the correct mechanism, preserve evidence of the actual impact and comply carefully with the contractual process.

Force majeure in shipping is determined by the contract, the facts and the timing, not by the severity of the headlines. As pressure continues across more than one of the region’s key maritime routes, the parties best placed to protect their position will be those that understand their contractual rights early, preserve the relevant evidence and act before the consequences of the disruption fully materialize.

 

About Fichte & Co

Fichte & Co is a full-service law firm founded in Dubai in 2005, with a long-standing focus on shipping, maritime and trade matters. The firm is also a founding member of the Maritime Law Association (UAE). With a presence across the UAE and Saudi Arabia, our team advises shipowners, charterers, traders, insurers and financial institutions on force majeure, war risk and the wider contractual consequences of geopolitical disruption.

To discuss how these developments may affect your contracts or operations, please contact our Partner Chakrapani Bodapati at chakrapani.bodapati@fichtelegal.com

Chakrapani Bodapati